India’s Independence and the Spiritual Destiny: Part M

The month of March is memorable for what took place in it in 1942. The most thorough account of that significant event appeared last year in the October issue of the Students' Magazine, Vers 1'Avenir, from the Sri Aurobindo International Centre of Education, pp. 22-25.

 

We congra­tulate its authors, Divakar and Sucharu, and are proud to reproduce their work in our pages minus the short introductory paragraph. At the end we have appended the famous exchange between Sri Aurobindo and Sir Stafford Cripps as well as some other relevant matter of importance not generally known.

 

This is the prefatory note by KD Sethna, the editor of Mother India when he published it in the March 1992 issue of the periodical.

In this talk we are going to look closely at the period between 1939 and 1942 in India's struggle for freedom. This was the period when the whole world was at war and the Indian people were one of the few exceptions who refused to take part in the war effort. As a part of their non-co-operation movement against their colonial rulers, the Indian National Congress, the most influential party of that time, decided not to support the war effort. The British, on their side, were anxious to secure India's participation in the war, for that would mean more men and more resources, which were badly needed.

 

To solve this somewhat intransigent situation arising out of India's demand for immediate and total independence and the British unwillingness to trust the Indians with the rule of the country at this crucial time, Sir Stafford Cripps came with his enterprising proposals.

 

Today we will firstly ascertain whether Cripps's proposals could have at all been accepted. And secondly, had they been accepted, whether the trauma of partition and all the serious and complex problems that are plaguing the country today could have been avoided.

 

It would not be altogether correct to say that India did not participate in the war effort. In fact, the war engaged officers and men of the Indian army which had strength of one million. And every month there were 50,000 recruits who were volunteering to join the war effort.

 

At the utmost, what one can say is that the public opinion in India regarded the war with a divided mind. As for the Congress the word of Gandhi, the most popular leader of the time, was taken as a gospel and it received an almost mystical veneration. Although he did not occupy any official position in the Congress organisation, he was invariably consulted on important issues and rarely was his advice not followed. Now, Gandhi could never be "in the war", for war is the extreme example of the violence that he condemned. "An Allied victory," he once said, "will not make the world a better world."

 

But one of the most interesting features of the Congress policy since the outbreak of the war had been its mixed reaction to Gandhi's idealism. For the first 10 months, the Congress was apparently prepared to support the war effort but only on certain conditions. From the autumn of 1940 to the winter of 1941-42, under Gandhi's personal direction the party protested against the war effort. But due to the unpopularity of this campaign, the movement petered out in 1941. During this time, a majority of leaders led by Jawaharlal Nehru and Rajagopalachary made it clear that they could not commit themselves to "non-­violence" in the face of a Japanese aggression.

 

No party—the Congress or the Muslim League—favoured the Nazis; in fact the public opinion was very much against Hitler and was with the Russians. But, on the other hand, fighting in the war meant siding with the British.

 

It was at this time that international sympathy grew for India.

 

In fact the U.S. senate issued a message with a serious undercurrent of anti-Britsh feeling. It said: "We should strongly demand that India be given a status of autonomy. The only way to get the people of India to fight is to get them to fight for India."

 

As I mentioned earlier, the Congress decided to join the war effort only on certain conditions and unless they were fulfilled, the Congress would continue its agitation of non-co-operation with the administration.

 

The two most important demands were:

 

That India be given freedom immediately.

And a new constitution be framed by Indians themselves.

 

The attitude of the British government to these demands is known as the "August offer" of 1940. This offer promised India the right to form its own constitution and decide for itself whether it wanted to remain in the Common­wealth or not. But it said that this intricate business involved legislatures and this could not be undertaken then itself as the British were struggling for their existence. However, Britain would implement these as soon as the war was over. In the meantime, India should co-operate fully in the war effort.

 

This offer was rejected out of hand by both the Congress and the Muslim League. The main cause of rejection was due to the distrust that had built up in the Indian Nationalists for 20 years against Britain. They could not trust her sincerity because all the promises were not straightforward but conditional. For example, they said that the new constitution must obtain the assent of the minority community. This evidently referred to the 90 million-strong Muslim community and Britain was taking advantage of the fact that the Muslim League would never approve of Congress policies and this would be an excuse for never setting India free.

 

From the "August offer" of 1940 to the famous Cripps proposals there was a lull in the political activities of both the British and the Indians. Though there were the Sapru proposals, which came after the "August offer", and a hectic struggle in Churchill's War Cabinet regarding India and the extent of autonomy that must be given to her, no concrete proposals emerged until 1942. In March the same year Cripps managed to veer the War Cabinet into accepting his proposals.

 

But before we come to the Cripps proposals proper, I will just trace the origin and the evolution of the offer which was formulated as way back as 1938.

 

The genesis of the Cripps offer occurred at the beginning of Nehru's visit to England in June 1938. Nehru went to Cripps's country house, where among many others was Sir Clement Attlee. The party discussed the means by which the Labour government would transfer power if they were elected. Cripps unveiled for the first time a provisional offer which resembled very much the later more famous Cripps offer. It said that an assembly would be elected by the Indian peoples to form a new constitution. This assembly would have separate repre­sentation of the minorities and the princely states. However, the free Indian government would be required to enter into a treaty with Britain who would look after the interest of the princely states during this transitional period. Nehru saw this as a modest demand for the acknowledgement of India's right to freedom and as a pre-requisite to co-operation during the war.

 

During Cripps's first visit to India which was in December 1939, he showed his scheme only to Gandhi and Nehru. All through his visit in India Cripps discussed this rudimentary form of his offer with Nehru. From his first reactions Nehru seemed to regard it as providing "some sort of basis". After a lot of reflection Nehru confirmed that Cripps's scheme was "broadly...on the right line".

 

At this point, Gandhi too reiterated Nehru's views. He said that except for 1 or 2 matters in Cripps's scheme, it was an acceptable basis for negotiation and arrangement.

 

Then the Second World War was declared and the Congress resigned from the 8 provinces where they were in power, as a protest against the British government's attitude of not consulting the Congress which was a major power then.

 

Zetland, an important official in the cabinet, wrote to the then Prime Minister Chamberlain in trying to look for a solution to the Indian impasse. He wrote: "The instrument is Sir Stafford Cripps." If Cripps were able to get the Indian leaders to agree to his plan, "we should find it very difficult on moral grounds alone to resist it."

 

But the coming of Churchill was a great setback to all the efforts of reconciliation. Zetland writes: "He (Churchill) did not share the same anxiety to encourage and promote unity between the Hindu and Muslim communities. Such unity was in fact almost out of the realms of practical politics, which if it were to be brought about, the immediate result would be that the united communities would join in showing us the door. He regarded the Hindu-Muslim feud as a bulwark of British rule in India."

 

Despite Zetland's intense effort at getting the cabinet to adopt his "con­structive plan of action", neither the cabinet nor the Viceroy from November 1939 to March 1940 was prepared to do so.

 

After the rejection of the "August offer" in 1940, the American and the world pressure forced Churchill to reconsider his hard-line policy towards India. Churchill looked for a scheme that would be acceptable to the Indians and would appease the American discontent.

 

The War Cabinet set about drafting such a proposal amid hectic political lobbying from the hardliners on the one hand and the India-sympathizers on the other. At this crucial phase of the discussion Cripps sprang his surprise; and, to cut the story short, he deftly manoeuvered his proposals amid criticism and doubt and managed to get them accepted by the War Cabinet.

 

On March 11, Churchill announced that the War Cabinet had agreed unitedly upon some proposals which would solve the crisis in India. Sir Stafford Cripps, Lord Privy Seal and leader of the House of Commons, would proceed as soon as possible to India to explain personally the solution agreed upon by the cabinet.

 

This startling announcement was well received in all political circles in India. That a cabinet minister should come out and discuss his government's policy face to face with Indians was in itself a proof of the seriousness with which the problem was viewed in London.

 

The object of the declaration was "the creation of a new Indian union which shall constitute a dominion, associated with the United Kingdom and other dominions by a common allegiance to the Crown, but equal to them in every respect, and in no way subordinate in any aspect of its domestic or external affairs, and free to remain in or to separate itself from the equal partnership of the British Commonwealth of nations."

 

And therefore the declaration was as follows:

 

Upon completion of the war steps would be taken to set up in India an elected body charged with the task of framing a new constitution for India.

 

The Indian states would be invited to participate in framing the new constitution.

 

His Majesty's government would accept and implement immediately the constitution so framed only on condition that:

 

A) Any province wanting to retain its present position will be allowed to do so, provisions being made for it to join at a later stage if it so desires. Such provinces, if they so wish, will be provided a new constitution equal in status to that of the Indian Union.

 

B) The signing of a treaty will be between His Majesty's government and the constitution-making body. This treaty will cover all necessary matters arising out of the complete transfer of responsibility from British to Indian hands. It will make provision for the protection of racial and religious minorities, but will not impose any restriction on the power of the Indian Union to decide in future its relationship to other Member States of the British Commonwealth.

 

C) Whether or not an Indian state elects to adhere to the Constitution it will be necessary to negotiate a revision of its treaty arrangements so far as this may be required in the new situation.

 

D) The constitution-making body shall be composed as follows unless the
Indian leaders in the principal communities agree upon some other form before the end of the war: A provincial election will be held immediately after the war and the members of the Lower House of the Provincial legislature so elected will proceed to elect a constitution-making body by the system of proportional representa­tion. This new body shall be in number about 1/10 (one-tenth) of the number of the electoral college.

 

E) But during the critical period which now faces India and until the new constitution can be framed, His Majesty's government will bear the responsibility for and retain the control and direction of the defence of India. But the task of organising to the full the military, moral, and material resources of India must be the responsibility of the government of India with the co-operation of the peoples of India.

 

His Majesty's government invites the participation of the leaders of the principal sections of the Indian people in the counsels of their country. Thus they will be able to contribute to the war effort which is vital and essential for the future freedom of India.

 

In England, though, Cripps's proposals received different reactions from the various quarters in the cabinet. Miss Agatha Harrison, who was shown the draft, said that she had no serious misgivings about the proposed arrangement. Cripps explained to her that within the Dominion status framework of the new constitution, India could break away from the Commonwealth, if it so wished, within 24 hours. He admitted the danger of Pakistan but argued that "even Gandhi said this idea should be among the schemes an assembly should discuss."

 

Linlithgow, the then Viceroy of India, regarded the proposals set forward by Cripps as a complete reversal of the British policy towards India, and threatened to resign. He said that Wavell regarded the declaration as disastrous and added that in his own view it was a calamity. But a prompt cajoling letter by Churchill dissuaded him from taking the extreme action; though Cripps would have been glad if that would have come about. There was also opposition among the ministers at the India office against the local option. By local option was meant the right given to the provinces to break away from India. After the meeting of ministers, one of them wrote: "...It would appear that the powers-that-are-to-be, are reconciled to the idea of a Muslim Confederation in the North. This means two India's and I am pressing for a central government."

 

The declaration soon became known as the Cripps offer. It was more concrete and constructive than the "August offer". It guaranteed India freedom immediately after the war and the option to frame its own constitution in the form of either a Dominionhood or of independence; and as soon as the constitution-making body was framed, the new constitution would take the place of the old one and the British government would leave the country.

 

The right of the princes to stand out of the post-war union of India was a further break from the no-freedom-without-unity policy. The provision for a treaty, whereby Britain would discharge her obligations to the dissident states and the minorities, set a time limit for the final transfer of power.

 

This evident departure in policy was the consequence of the overthrow of the formerly dominant Conservative party's influence in the War Cabinet. Wartime defeats and dependence upon the USA abroad and the Labour party at home made the pressures for changes irresistible.

 

In these circumstances Cripps became confident that Linlithgow could be displaced by a new Viceroy who would bring the Congress and the League together in a restructured Executive, acting as a National government. Cripps got everything that he wanted into the declaration except the replacement of Linlithgow, which later proved to be fatal.

 

On Saturday, 14th March 1942, Cripps set off for India. The only specific instruction from the War Cabinet to him was regarding the reconstruction of the Executive. It said that the Executive must not be more than advisory or consultative. Cripps could contemplate minor changes in the reconstruction of the Executive, but he could not negotiate away the Viceroy's statutory power and his special responsibilities.

 

Cripps arrived at New Delhi on the 23rd of March and immediately announced: "I have come here...because I want to play my part as a member of the War Cabinet in reaching a final settlement of the political difficulties which have long vexed our relationship. Once these questions are resolved, the Indian people will be enabled to associate themselves fully and freely...with our great allies, so that together we can assert our domination to preserve the Liberty of the peoples of the world."

 

From the 25th onwards, he began meeting the Indian leaders. The first to come was Maulana Azad, the Congress president. Next was Jinnah.

 

Cripps showed Azad his proposal for the new Executive. He told Azad that the present members would be replaced by men chosen by the Viceroy from the list of nominees furnished by the Indian parties. The Executive would be fully Indianized save for the Commander-in-chief. I quote Cripps here: "The system of government would not however be changed. The Viceroy would function as a Constitutional head like the King in the United Kingdom, normally accepting the advice of his council. The council would approximate to a cabinet in its operation."

 

Now, according to J Moore who is a renowned historian and the author of Churchill, Cripps and India, "Azad misunderstood Cripps, believing him to say that the Viceroy's special responsibilities and veto would be withdrawn. Many felt that Azad's command of English was limited."

 

On his part, Azad came out clearly and stated: "I asked Sir Stafford what would be the position of the Viceroy in this council. Sir Stafford replied that the Viceroy would function as a Constitutional head like the King in the United Kingdom. In order to remove any room for doubt, I asked him to confirm that this would mean that the Viceroy, as a Constitutional head, would be bound by the advice of the Council. Sir Stafford said this was the intention. I asked again that the basic question was as to who would exercise power, the proposed Council or the Viceroy. Sir Stafford repeated that power would rest within the Council as it rests in the British cabinet... Our first interview thus came to an end on a note of optimism."

 

Jinnah had grown in political stature since Cripps had met him in December 1939. With the avowed goal of sovereign Muslim homelands he was increasingly accepted as the spokesman for Muslim Nationhood. Cripps explained to him the changes in his own views since 1939, when he had regarded Pakistan as a mere bargaining device. Jinnah on his part seemed rather surprised that the declara­tion went so far as to meet the Pakistan case. Cripps was impressed by his attitude.

 

Cripps met Gandhi for almost 2 hours on the 27th of March. Gandhi emphasized that he had "...nothing to do with Congress officially."

 

Cripps found him antagonistic towards the declaration, which he (Gandhi) expected the Congress to reject. Gandhi criticized the virtual invitation to the Muslims to create Pakistan. Cripps stressed that the declaration envisaged Indian unity and that non-accession would occur only if the constitution making body disagreed. Cripps told Gandhi that once the constituent assembly body was formed and Britain was out of the way, the Indians themselves ought to be able to agree upon a constitution for unity. In fact, when Cripps reminded Gandhi that the latter had gone through the Cripps plan in detail in Wardha in 1938 and had observed that the possibility of Pakistan should be included among the schemes an assembly should discuss, Gandhi said that he never remembered having made that statement.

 

Azad writes: "When Gandhiji met Cripps for the first time during his mission, Cripps reminded him of the aide memoir to which reference has already been made. Cripps said that the aide memoir had already been prepared after consultation with the Congress leaders including Gandhiji. The proposals he had now brought were substantially the same. Gandhiji said that he had no recollection of the aide memoir. All that he could remember of his talk with Cripps during his last visit were...some discussions about vegetarianism. Cripps replied that it was his misfortune that Gandhiji could remember his talk on food, but not about the proposals he had so carefully prepared after consulting Gandhiji himself."

 

On 28th Cripps met the most moderate of Congress leaders, Rajagopalachary, whose view was that something should be done as regards the redrafting of the last paragraph in order to make it clear that the Indian people were asked to defend their own country and that it was not merely the obligation of the British government. Cripps obliged and the last paragraph was suitably modified.

 

In the meantime Cripps met Jinnah and gathered that the League working committee had accepted the Declaration in principle. Later in the day, one of their senior leaders, Sikander Hyat Khan, confirmed this news, and argued that in order to win over the Congress some appearance of defence responsibility should be given to an Indian. Azad also accepted that His Majesty's government must control strategy and troop movements.

 

Nehru arrived in Delhi by train the next day, the 29th of March. He had been bed-ridden with fever for two days and was to remain unwell throughout the negotiations.

 

As Nehru had not yet discussed the declaration with his colleagues he and Cripps went off to the Congress headquarters at Birla house where Cripps remained for 3 hours. They were joined by Azad who took them to Gandhi. There was a good deal of banter, with Cripps trying to pin down Gandhi to admit that he had approved Cripps scheme in December 1939 after a line by line reading of it.

 

Gandhi finally acquiesced, explaining that he had dismissed the occasion from his mind as merely an encounter with one of the "globe-trotters". Their conversation further confirmed Cripps's impression that India's association with the defence portfolio was the key to Congress acceptance of the declaration.

 

On the same day Cripps released the Declaration at a press conference where for 2 hours he answered questions for a group of about 100 journalists. He explained the paragraph (E) at this press conference:

 

The intention of this paragraph is to indicate to the Governor-General, who is responsible for the formation of a government in India, the broad lines upon which, in accordance with the scheme, that government might be formed... The object of the scheme is to give the fullest measure of government to the Indian people at the present time consistent with the possibilities of a consti­tution which cannot be changed until the end of the war... You cannot change the constitution. All you can do is to change the convictions of the constitution. You can turn the Executive Council into a cabinet... The leaders of the principal sections of the Indian people are to be invited to play their full and effective part which means to say that the intention of this document is as far as possible subject to the reservation of defence to put power into the hands of Indian leaders... We want the government to be fully Indianized.

 

Sir Coupland, another noted historian, summarizes the reaction of the press towards the Cripps' proposals. He said: "As I watched the faces of the Indian journalists and observed the manner of the questioners I was quite certain that Sir Stafford's sincerity was never for a moment doubted."

 

The next day, Gandhi, who had remained in Delhi at Azad's request, vehemently opposed the Declaration and called it "a post-dated cheque on a crashing bank."

 

That night Nehru dined with Cripps and they talked until late in the night. Cripps notes that he had never known Nehru more serious and more worried. From their conversation Cripps drew the conclusion that while Nehru and Rajaji were "doing their best to secure acceptance, Gandhi was against it and with his pacifist supporters would probably obtain a majority of the working committee."

 

The great obstacle was "The non-violent outlook of Gandhi and his supporters, which obviously was opposed to the idea of mobilising effectively the armed defence of India", rather than "any particular provision of the scheme itself." Cripps imagined Gandhi to be (I quote Cripps) "actually desirous to bring about a state of chaos while he sat at Wardha eating vegetables."

 

For the first time Cripps took a dark view of the prospects of his mission. The following days witnessed a see-saw change in the fortunes of the mission. At one point the Congress working committee was 7 to 5 against the proposals. After further negotiations, the balance favoured Cripps at 7 to 5. This fluctua­tion continued until finally on the 10th of April, at 7 pm Cripps received a letter from Maulana Azad rejecting his proposals on the ground that the members of the Executive Council could not act "as members of a cabinet in a constitutional government." In effect, what the Congress wanted was a national government which had to be a cabinet government with full power.

 

This meant a drastic change in the constitution. And as Cripps had already stated, "Everyone agrees that in these troubled times we cannot, here and now, set about forging a new constitution."

 

And so Cripps returned to England unsuccessful in the mission he once so successfully initiated, amid lots of opposition, for the people of India.

 

In our post-mortem of the Cripps proposals, let us consider the possibility of the declaration being accepted. Many historians maintain that the acceptance of this declaration would have still meant inevitably the partition of India, because the Muslim League, led by Jinnah, regarded the partition of India as the only possible solution. Therefore, if a choice was given to all the provinces, it seemed certain that India would be fragmented.

 

But on the other hand non-accession alone was the way by which partition could be avoided. For, Cripps based himself on the profound psychological truth that one normally does not like to do what one is asked to do and by stimulating the Muslim's appetite for partition, Cripps hoped to keep India intact. Just as there was a chance of India wanting to stay in the British Commonwealth if she was free to go out, likewise the best hope of a single Indian Union lay in assuring the people of the predominantly Muslim areas, that they need not join the Union unless they wished.

 

And moreover, if the Cripps proposals had been accepted, then the Congress and the Muslim league would have had to work together and at that time they could definitely have arrived at a compromise. They could have adopted a loose federation of the provinces with enough safeguards to take care of the minority interests.

 

In regard to the composition of the Executive council, it is important that the Indians in the council have effective power in the running of the government. Sri Aurobindo during the First World War, had proposed a set of guidelines which he felt must satisfy India in order to participate in the war effort. There he had specified that the Indian ministers in charge of defence should not have their responsibilities curtailed to the point that they run only hospitals and ambu­lances. The ministers in the cabinet must have effective powers. And this much was promised in Cripps's proposals. It would be ridiculous to accept the Congress' claim that the council should function as a cabinet, and military decisions reached by the ministers would be binding on the Viceroy.

 

Frankly speaking, there was none in the Congress who had the experience and the competence for running the defence ministry at a time when the Axis Powers had the upper hand in the war.

 

When Cripps had come to India, he had told a journalist that if he could reach an agreement with the Congress on the reconstruction of the Executive then his powers would be such as to enable him to overcome any resistance by Linlithgow. I quote Cripps: "I told Nehru that if they accepted my terms I should be such a tremendous figure in England that I could do anything." It was generally believed that if Cripps brought off the settlement, he would replace Churchill. And then from his position of power he could grant any concession, short of complete independence, to the Congress.

 

But the most important reason why Cripps's proposals should have been accepted is the same reason why the British government was anxious that India accept it. The Allies winning the war was crucial to India's future because in the case of an Axis victory, India's future would be doomed under the yoke of the cruel and ruthless Japanese and Germans. Therefore it was important that India joined the war and ensured the victory of the Allies. The British too were keen that India joined the war effort.

 

Cripps's proposals were therefore doubly beneficial to India. Not only was India offered an honourable opportunity to join the war but its independence was presented on a platter if India so agreed.

 

Even considering the possibility where the British would go back on their word and not give us our independence after the war, India had still to gain from an Allied victory. Moreover it would have been impossible for Britain to go back on her word, for the whole world, and especially America, would force her to keep her wartime promises. Therefore it can be seen that Cripps' proposals should have been accepted by the Indian leaders.

 

Many of you must be disappointed that we have not mentioned Sri Aurobindo's name as regards this mission. We have acted thus for two specific reasons.

 

Firstly it is a well known fact (and therefore needless to mention), especially in the Ashram, that Sri Aurobindo openly supported the Cripps offer and even sent Duraiswamy Aiyar, as his envoy, with a message to the Congress leaders, suggesting to them to accept the proposals. Unfortunately the leaders of the time did not give the message their due respect, even though Sri Aurobindo had been himself a major political force and an established statesman in the early 20th century.

 

The second more important reason is that we did not want people to swallow Sri Aurobindo's opinion of the proposals merely on faith. We wanted them to realise that, if viewed rationally, the proposals corroborated Sri Aurobindo's point of view. We hope we have been successful in our endeavour.

Appendix

 

Sri Aurobindo and Cripps's Proposal

Since coming to Pondicherry, Sri Aurobindo had retired from public life. In his own words, "His retirement from political life was complete, just as was his personal retirement into solitude in 1910." There were two occasions when he had to take public action. The first in relation to the Second World War when, in 1940, September 10th he and the Mother made a joint declaration in support of the Allies. The second was his public support to Cripps' proposal.

 

On 31st March 1942 he sent the following telegram to Cripps: "I have heard your broadcast. As one who has been a nationalist leader and worker for India's independence, though now my activity is no longer in the political but in the spiritual field, I wish to express my appreciation of all you have done to bring about this offer. I welcome it as an opportunity given to India to determine for herself, and organise in all liberty of choice, her freedom and unity, and take an effective place among the world's free nations. I hope that it will be accepted, and right use made of it, putting aside all discords and divisions. I hope too that friendly relations between Britain and India, replacing past struggles, will be a step towards a greater world union in which, as a free nation, her spiritual force will contribute to build for mankind a better and happier life. In this light, I offer my public adhesion, in case it can be of any help in your work." The above implies a successful end to the war and a united free India.

 

Sri Aurobindo envisaged two great perils facing the country, domination by Japan and partition of our Motherland, and according to him the way to prevent both of them successfully was to accept Cripps's proposal. He made this clear in his personal message through Duraiswamy Aiyar to the Congress Working Committee and in his" telegrams to Dr Munje, the Hindu Mahasabha leader, and to C Rajagopalachary. In the telegram to Dr Munje he asked if there was no way to accept cooperation, while resisting the partition of India, and arrive at a settlement with Britain in view of the grave peril facing India. He further suggested a combination of Congress nationalist and anti-Jinnah Muslims so as to defeat the League in the elections in Bengal, Punjab and Sind. His telegram to C Rajagopalachari on the same day, namely 2 April 1942, reads, "Is not compro­mise defence question better than rupture. Some immediate settlement urgent, face grave peril. Have sent Duraiswamy insist urgency. Appeal to you to save India formidable danger new foreign domination when old on way to self-elimination."

 

Sir Stafford Cripps's reply of 1 April 1942 by telegram to Sri Aurobindo's message was: "I am most touched and gratified by your kind message allowing me to inform India that you who occupy unique position in imagination of Indian youth are convinced that declaration of His Majesty's Government substantially confers that freedom for which Indian Nationalism has so long struggled."

 

Arthur Moore, editor of the Calcutta daily Statesman, telegraphed to Sri Aurobindo on 1st April 1942 saying, "Your message to Sir Stafford Cripps inaugurates the new era. Nothing can prevent it. I am glad that my eyes have seen this salvation coming."

 

Amarendra Chatterji, Member Central Legislative Assembly, sent the following telegram to Sri Aurobindo on 9 April 1942: "Thanks broken silence pray come lead again. With [M.N.] Roy may yet save hesitant confused misled public." He also wanted Sri Aurobindo to lead a new party, even though it be from Pondicherry, a party called The People's Progressive Party. Sri Aurobindo replied to Amarendra Chatterji telegraphically, saying that he was unable to leave Pondicherry. A similar reply was given by Duraiswamy on Sri Aurobindo's behalf to the Congress Working Committee.

 

The negotiations failed and the proposal was rejected. In his own words Sri Aurobindo gives the reasons why he supported Cripps's proposal. He gave his support "because, by its acceptance, India and Britain could stand united against the Asuric forces and the solution of Cripps could be used as a step towards independence. When negotiations failed, Sri Aurobindo returned to his reliance on the use of spiritual force alone against the aggressor and had the satisfaction of seeing the tide of Japanese victory, which had till then swept everything before it, change immediately into a tide of rapid, crushing and finally immense and overwhelming defeat. He had also after a time the satisfaction of seeing his previsions about the future of India justify themselves so that she stands independent with whatever internal difficulties."

 

In the first draft of his telegram to Cripps the last sentence had read: "I hope that in stating my adhesion I speak for the deeper soul of India." He altered it to the form quoted earlier. Nirodbaran has reported: "When the rejection was announced, Sri Aurobindo said in a quiet tone, 'I knew it would fail.' We at once pounced on the words and asked him, 'Why did you then send Duraiswamy at all?' 'For a bit of nishkama karma [disinterested work] was the calm reply."

 

[Quotations from Sri Aurobindo are from pp. 39-40 of Vol. 26 of the Sri Aurobindo Birth Centenary Library.]